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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
This is a diversity case in which an interlocutory appeal 
has been taken from the denial of a preliminary injunction. 
The appeal presents a question of Pennsylvania law. The 
question is whether, on the particular facts of this case, the 
loss by one publicly traded corporation of a contractual 
opportunity to acquire another publicly traded corporation 
through a corporate merger constitutes irreparable harm. 
In concluding that the plaintiff -- the would-be acquiring 
corporation -- was not entitled to a preliminary injunction 
compelling specific performance of the merger agreement, 
the district court ruled that if the plaintiff prevailed on the 
merits it would have an adequate remedy at law in the form 
of an action for damages. Plaintiff's contention that the loss 
of the numerous expected benefits of the merger was not 
quantifiable as damages, and hence constituted irreparable 
injury, was rejected by the district court. On this appeal, 
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plaintiff renews that contention. We conclude that, in the 
context of this case, plaintiff's contention is soundly based. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the district 
court and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Allegheny Energy, Inc. ("Allegheny")1 and DQE, Inc. 
("DQE") -- both of which are utility companies whose 
shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange -- 
entered into a merger agreement on April 7, 1997. The 
agreement envisioned a combined company in which DQE 
would be a wholly-owned subsidiary of Allegheny. Allegheny 
is a utility holding company that provides electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution, chiefly in 
Pennsylvania, Maryland and West Virginia; its principal 
operating subsidiary is West Penn, a franchised electric 
service provider in western Pennsylvania. DQE is also a 
utility holding company; its principal operating subsidiary 
is Duquesne, a franchised provider in western 
Pennsylvania. 
 
The merger agreement describes the context in which the 
agreement was signed: 
 
        The electric utility industry throughout the United 
       States is in the early stages of dramatic changes that 
       are intended to bring competition to what has been, 
       since the electric industry's inception, a collection of 
       regional monopolies. These changes have been brought 
       about in part through the adoption of the Energy Policy 
       Act of 1992 and through orders 888 and 889 of the 
       FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. In 
       addition, in Pennsylvania, where DQE has all of its 
       electric utility business and [Allegheny] has a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Several of the documents in the appendix provided to this court 
identify Allegheny as "Allegheny Power Systems, Inc." or "APS". The 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission has noted that "APS has 
changed its name to Allegheny Energy, Inc." Order on Reconsideration, 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Docket # A-110150F.0015 (July 
23, 1998), at n.1. We have substituted "[Allegheny]" for "Allegheny Power 
Systems, Inc." or "APS" wherever we have cited documents employing the 
erstwhile corporate name or its acronym. 
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       substantial portion of its electric utility business, the 
       trend to bring about competition led to the enactment 
       in late 1996 of the Electricity Generation Customer 
       Choice and Competition Act, 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 2801 
       et seq. (the "Pennsylvania Restructuring Legislation"), 
       which provides, among other things, for a phase in of 
       competition for retail electric customers in 
       Pennsylvania and an opportunity for recovery of certain 
       capital costs ("stranded costs") incurred by utilities in 
       a regulated environment that are not likely to be 
       recoverable through prices charged in a competitive 
       environment. 
 
A81. The Pennsylvania Restructuring Legislation 
empowered the Pennsylvania Utilities Commission ("PUC") 
"to determine the level of transition of stranded costs for 
each electric utility and to provide a mechanism, the 
competitive transition charge, for recovery of an appropriate 
amount of such costs . . . ." 66 P.S.A. S 2802 (15) (1997).2 
 
The Joint Proxy Statement prepared by Allegheny and 
DQE -- a statement sent to shareholders of both 
corporations prior to the shareholder votes of May, 1997 
approving the merger agreement -- described several 
strategic benefits of the merger. In particular, the Joint 
Proxy Statement noted that the Allegheny Board of 
Directors had identified the following reasons for the 
merger: 
 
        (i) the Merger would better position [Allegheny] to 
       take advantage of changes in the electric utility 
       industry by expanding its service territory and number 
       of customers served by combining its existing service 
       territories with DQE's contiguous service territories; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The competitive transition charge ("CTC") -- intended to recompense 
utilities for "stranded costs" -- is paid by customers. In addition to 
allowing customers to purchase electricity from the generator of their 
choice and empowering the PUC to assess a CTC appropriate to each 
utility's stranded costs, the restructuring legislation requires utilities 
to 
"unbundle" their services. Before the restructuring legislation, the PUC 
set a single electric rate reflecting generation, transmission, and 
delivery 
of electricity; the restructuring legislation will eventually require all 
customers to pay two (unbundled) rates: a negotiated rate for electricity 
generation, and a set rate for electricity transmission and delivery. 
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        (ii) [Allegheny] management has historically been 
       better than its peer companies at managing electric 
       generation, transmission and distribution and its belief 
       that the Merger would permit the combined 
       management to utilize this expertise over greater 
       amounts of generation and distribution; 
 
        (iii) based upon reports from its outside advisors and 
       [Allegheny] management and publicly available 
       materials regarding DQE, DQE management has 
       historically been better than its peer companies in 
       developing unregulated businesses and the [Allegheny] 
       Board's belief that the Merger would permit the 
       combined management to utilize this expertise as a 
       part of a bigger, financially stronger enterprise; 
 
        (iv) the terms of the recently enacted Pennsylvania 
       restructuring legislation and the significant mitigation 
       efforts already undertaken by DQE would permit DQE 
       to recover such stranded costs associated with DQE's 
       investment in the Nuclear Facilities as determined to 
       be just and reasonable by the PAPUC; and 
 
        (v) the synergies estimated by the managements of 
       [Allegheny] and DQE appear to be achievable. 
 
A82. Similarly, the Joint Proxy Statement noted that the 
DQE Board of Directors had identified the following reasons 
for the merger: 
 
        (i) the Merger will allow the combined company to 
       . . . have the critical mass necessary to compete in a 
       deregulated utility environment; 
 
        (ii) the estimated synergies from the Merger should 
       improve DQE's financial performance due to savings 
       from the elimination of duplicate activities and by 
       creating improved operating efficiencies and lower 
       capital costs; 
 
        (iii) the Merger will permit stockholders of DQE to 
       benefit from the combined company's ability to take 
       advantage of future strategic opportunities and to 
       reduce its exposure to changes in economic conditions 
       in any segment of its business; 
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        (iv) the combined service territories of DQE and 
       [Allegheny] will be more geographically diverse than the 
       service territory of DQE alone, reducing DQE's 
       exposure to changes in economic competitive or 
       climatic conditions as well as providing a larger 
       regional platform from which to expand DQE's 
       customer base; 
 
        (v) [Allegheny]'s winter-peaking, low-cost, efficient 
       operations, and suburban and rural customer base, 
       will complement DQE's summer-peaking operations 
       and urban customer base; 
 
        (vi) DQE's current customers will receive a wider 
       range of energy-related products and services; and 
 
        (vii) DQE's mix of regulated and unregulated energy 
       products and services provides a strategic fit with 




Section 6.1 of the merger agreement has provided rules 
for the period between the signing of the agreement and 
consummation of the merger -- a consummation contingent 
both on the stockholder approvals referred to above and on 
approvals by the relevant regulatory boards.3 Among the 
interim rules is a prohibition on any action "that would 
prevent the Merger from qualifying for `pooling of interests' 
accounting treatment." A31.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 6.1 states that each company must operate "in the ordinary 
and usual course" of business and "use its best efforts" to "preserve its 
business organization intact and maintain its existing relations and 
goodwill." Moreover, it generally prohibits either party from unilaterally 
repurchasing stock, encumbering assets, changing stock-based 
compensation plans, or changing any compensation and benefit plan. 
See A30-31. 
 
4. Under certain circumstances, stock-for-stock mergers may be 
structured to take advantage of an accounting method-- pooling of 
interests accounting treatment -- that provides financial advantages to 
the newly combined company by permitting the absorbed corporation's 
assets to be recorded at book value. See Daniel W. Jones & Val R. 
Bitton, Accounting for Business Combinations, in D.R. Carmichael et al., 
ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 6.2-.3 (7th ed. 1991). Valuing the absorbed 
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Other agreement provisions allow either party to abort 
the agreement prior to consummation under certain 
conditions. Most prominent is Section 8.2(a), under which 
Allegheny and DQE each reserved the right to terminate the 
contract on October 5, 1998 in the event that the merger 
was not consummated by that date. However, under 
Section 8.2(a), the October 5, 1998 date is automatically 
moved forward six months, to April 5, 1999, if, on October 
5, 1998, certain conditions have been met, among them 
that "each of the other conditions to the consummation of 
the Merger . . . has been satisfied or waived or can readily 
be satisfied . . . ." A42.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
corporation's assets at book value permits two savings: the combined 
company avoids recording the absorbed corporation's goodwill and 
avoids recording the (often higher) fair market value of the absorbed 
corporation's assets. Charles H. Meyer, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR 
LAWYERS IN A NUTSHELL  311-13 (1995). The combined company is thus 
freed from the requirement of amortizing the greater costs against its 
earnings over the ensuing years. Id. A combined corporation emerging 
from a merger accounted for under the pooling of interests method 
therefore would report higher annual earnings than the same 
corporation emerging from a merger accounted for under the traditional 
purchase method. Id.  
 
In order to qualify for pooling of interests accounting treatment, a 
merger must meet several conditions. Those requirements fall into three 
groups: (1) characteristics of the combining companies; (2) manner of the 
combination; and (3) absence of pre- and post-combination transactions. 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16, "Business Combinations" 
(1970). See also generally AICPA Accounting Interpretations of APB 
Opinion No. 16. The third group of requirements is at issue in this case. 
The APB Opinion and Interpretations identify a number of actions that 
can frustrate pooling of interests accounting treatment if taken after the 
signing of a merger agreement and before consummation of the merger. 
Many of those actions can be taken unilaterally, and several -- such as 
a new stock award plan for officers and directors-- can occur without 
prior public announcement. 
 
5. Section 8.1 permits termination by mutual written consent of both 
boards of directors. Section 8.3 permits Allegheny to terminate the 
agreement under certain circumstances, including a material breach by 
DQE that cannot be cured within thirty days. Section 8.4 permits DQE 
to terminate the agreement under certain circumstances, including a 
material breach by Allegheny that cannot be cured within thirty days. 
A42. 
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On August 1, 1997 (about four months after the merger 
agreement was signed), pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
restructuring legislation, Duquesne and West Penn-- the 
parties' major operating subsidiaries -- eachfiled 
restructuring plans with the PUC, and the two filed joint 
applications for PUC and Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission ("FERC") approval of the merger. Almost eight 
months later, on March 25, 1998, PUC administrative law 
judges issued recommendations in the Duquesne and West 
Penn restructuring cases. On May 29, 1998, the PUC 
modified the administrative law judges' recommendations in 
the two cases. West Penn was disallowed approximately $1 
billion of the $1.6 billion in allegedly stranded costs that it 
had requested.6 
 
In a July 23, 1998 Order, the PUC held that the merged 
company would have to prove that it had mitigated its 
market power at a market power hearing to be held in the 
year 2000. Should the merged company fail at that time to 
establish that it had mitigated its market power, the PUC 
would order it to divest itself of 2500 megawatts of 
generation by July 1, 2000. Order on Reconsideration, 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Docket # A- 
110150F.0015 (July 23, 1998), at 10. 
 
The FERC -- which like the PUC has jurisdiction over 
market power issues -- also found certain elements of the 
parties' joint proposal related to market power to be 
inadequate. On September 16, 1998, the FERC ordered the 
companies either to divest DQE's Cheswick plant prior to 
the merger or to submit to a hearing on market power 
mitigation. A329. 
 
DQE was concerned with what it viewed as the "material 
adverse effects" of the PUC Order in the West Penn case, 
the PUC market power order, and the FERC market power 
order. On October 5, 1998, DQE informed Allegheny that, 
pursuant to Section 8.2(a) of the merger agreement, it was 
terminating the agreement.7 Allegheny immediately filed a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See note 2, supra. 
 
7. As noted in text and footnote at note 5, supra, Section 8.2(a) 
authorized either party to terminate the agreement if the merger was not 
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complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking specific 
performance of the merger agreement, and -- fearing that 
DQE would take action to scuttle pooling of interests 
accounting treatment -- filed an accompanying motion 
seeking both a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction "enjoining DQE from taking any 
action that it is precluded from taking without Allegheny's 
consent under Section 6.1 of the Merger Agreement" until 
Allegheny's claim for specific performance was decided. 
A401. 
 
The District Court heard argument on the motion on 
October 5 and October 26. After considering testimony and 
certain affidavits, the District Court denied both the 
temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction. 
The District Court began its analysis by observing that 
Allegheny had presented "persuasive" arguments that it had 
a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its claim 
that it was entitled to specific performance. Order at 3. The 
court then turned to the question whether Allegheny had 
demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm absent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
consummated by October 5, 1998, but also made provision for automatic 
extension of the October date to April 5, 1999. Section 8.2(a) required 
that the October 5, 1998 deadline be automatically extended to April 5, 
1999 if certain conditions were met, among them that"(ii) each of the 
other conditions to the consummation of the Merger set forth in Article 
VII has been satisfied or waived or can readily be satisfied." A42. DQE 
asserted that Allegheny triggered DQE's Section 8.2(a) termination right 
by failing to meet Section 7.3(a), one of the consummation conditions set 
forth in Article VII. Section 7.3(a) conditions the merger on the fact 
that 
all "representations and warranties . . . set forth in this Agreement 
shall 
be true and correct as of the date of this Agreement and as of the 
Closing Date . . . ." A41. DQE claims that Allegheny failed to meet 
Section 7.3(a) because one of its representations or warranties, Section 
5.1(f), was no longer true. Section 5.1(f) states that "since the Audit 
Date 
. . . there has not been (i) any change in the financial condition, 
properties, business or results of operations . . .[or] developments 
affecting it of which its management has knowledge that . . . is 
reasonably likely to have a Material Adverse Effect on it . . . ." A23. In 
DQE's view, the regulatory rulings were likely to have a material adverse 
effect on Allegheny's business. 
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the injunction. The court thought damages would be an 
adequate legal remedy for breach of the merger agreement 
because "[b]usiness valuation experts are routinely called 
upon to value business mergers." Accordingly, the court 
concluded that not granting the requested preliminary 
injunction would not cause Allegheny irreparable injury. Id. 
at 4. The court further found that granting an injunction 
would entail "the possibility of harm to DQE." Id. at 5. 
Finally, the court found that the public interest "weighs 
substantially against the granting of injunctive relief" 
primarily for two reasons: (a) the court believed it would 
have "to become involved in the business affairs" of the 
parties and; (b) the court believed that "unintended 
collision with regulatory agencies and their statutory 
mandates" loomed as a possibility. Id. at 5-6. Allegheny 
appealed under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). 
 
II. Preliminary Injunction Standard 
 
"Four factors," as we have recently had occasion to 
observe, 
 
       govern a district court's decision whether to issue a 
       preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has 
       shown a reasonable probability of success on the 
       merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably 
       injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting 
       preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the 
       nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the 
       preliminary relief will be in the public interest. 
 
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse 
Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1996) (en banc). See also Council of Alternative Political 
Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997). A 
district court should endeavor to "balance[ ] these four . . . 
factors to determine if an injunction should issue." 
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, 84 F.3d at 
1477 n.2. 
 
Our review of a district court's denial of a preliminary 
injunction is limited to determining "whether there has 
been `an abuse of discretion, a clear error of law, or a clear 
mistake on the facts.' " McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation 
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Council for Graduate Med. Educ., 24 F.3d 519, 523 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 
186, 198 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 
III. Specific Performance and Irreparable Harm 
 
A. Choice of Law 
 
This diversity case is governed by Pennsylvania law. In 
their merger agreement, the parties agreed that "this 
agreement shall be deemed to be made in, and in all 
respects shall be interpreted, construed and governed by 
and in accordance with the law of, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania without regard to the conflict of law principles 
thereof." A45 (complete capitalization omitted). The parties' 
contractual choice of law does not appear arbitrary: one of 
the two parties is a Pennsylvania corporation, and 
Pennsylvania is the state in which the parties' chief 
subsidiaries -- West Penn and Duquesne -- conduct their 
principal operations.8 
 
Notwithstanding that Pennsylvania law governs this case, 
the briefs on appeal and the oral arguments before this 
court have not focused on Pennsylvania cases, presumably 
for the reason that counsel for both parties have found the 
case law from other jurisdictions to touch more closely than 
the Pennsylvania cases on the particular factual scenario 
presented by this litigation. We too have found no 
Pennsylvania cases that closely mirror the dispute between 
Allegheny and DQE. But our review of the pertinent 
Pennsylvania cases persuades us that the dispute at bar 
may be properly addressed within the general framework of 
those cases -- resting as they do on broadly familiar 
principles. And so, in the discussion which follows, we 
commence our analysis with those Pennsylvania cases. We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Had the parties not stipulated that their agreement is to be governed 
by Pennsylvania law "without regard to the conflict of law principles 
thereof," the Erie doctrine would have required the application of 
Pennsylvania law, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 34 (1938), but with 
the inclusion of Pennsylvania conflict of laws principles. Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 
                                11 
  
then turn to consider the pertinent case law on which the 
parties have chiefly relied -- i.e., case law from other 
jurisdictions: taken as a whole, those cases -- some of 
which are, indeed, factually more akin to the present 
dispute than the Pennsylvania cases -- build upon the 
broad foundational principles that inform the Pennsylvania 
cases. We feel comfortable in concluding, therefore, that 
lessons drawn from non-Pennsylvania cases have proper 
application to the Pennsylvania dispute before the court. 
 
We begin with a consideration of the law of specific 
performance -- in Pennsylvania first, and then more 
broadly. After addressing the question whether specific 
performance would be the appropriate remedy for the 
breach of contract alleged in this case, we inquire whether 
an affirmative answer to that question mandates afinding 
of irreparable harm. 
 




Allegheny argues that it is entitled to specific 
performance -- not just money damages -- because of "the 
inherent uniqueness of a company sought to be acquired, 
and the irreparable harm suffered by the party acquiring 
the company by the loss of the opportunity to own or 
control that business." Pl. Br. at 22 (citing Peabody Holding 
Co., Inc. v. Costain Group PLC, 813 F. Supp. 1402, 1421 
(E.D. Mo. 1993)). DQE disagrees, arguing that corporate 
combinations are regularly valued. 
 
Pennsylvania law conforms to the general rules regarding 
the availability of specific performance. "Specific 
performance should only be granted . . . where no adequate 
remedy at law exists." Clark v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
436 A.2d 1383, 1385 (Pa. 1981) (citing Roth v. Hartl, 75 
A.2d 583 (Pa. 1970)). "Equitable jurisdiction to grant 
specific performance," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
observed in 1986, "depends upon the `inadequacy' of the 
remedy at law." Petry v. Tanglwood Lakes, Inc., 522 A.2d 
1053, 1056 (Pa. 1986). Seventy years earlier the court had 
stated the principle in the following terms: "The mere fact 
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that a remedy at law exists is not sufficient to oust 
equitable jurisdiction; the question is whether the remedy 
is adequate or complete." Edison Illuminating Co. v. Eastern 
Pa. Power Co., 98 A. 652, 655 (Pa. 1916). With respect to 
what constitutes an adequate remedy at law, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed that "[a]n action 
for damages is an inadequate remedy when there is no 
method by which the amount of damages can be accurately 
computed or ascertained." Clark, 436 A.2d at 1385 (citing 
Strank v. Mercy Hospital of Johnstown, 117 A.2d 697 (Pa. 
1955)). Damages cannot be accurately ascertained"where 
the subject matter of an agreement is an asset that is 
unique or one such that its equivalent cannot be purchased 
on the open market." Tomb v. Lavalle, 444 A.2d 666, 668 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).9 
 
These general rules are unremarkable. But the parties 
have not cited, nor has our research disclosed, any 
published Pennsylvania opinion discussing the applicability 
of these general rules to a situation presenting the same 
characteristics as the case at bar -- i.e., a dispute arising 
out of the alleged breach of a merger agreement between 
two publicly traded companies. Accordingly, we look for 
guidance to the handful of Pennsylvania cases in which the 
general rules have been applied to closely cognate 
situations: broken agreements for the acquisition of an 
existing business or the development of a business 
opportunity. 
 
In Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 49 A.2d 692 (Pa. 1946), the 
court upheld an award of specific performance of a contract 
for the sale of a restaurant and liquor business, finding 
that "a similar restaurant and liquor business to the one in 
question could not be purchased in the market, and 
therefore could not be reproduced by money damages." Id. 
at 361. "In this connection," the court continued, 
 
       the learned chancellor properly said: `The contract 
       involved here is one for the sale of a certain restaurant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. A good need not be inherently unique; it may become unique by virtue 
of its context. See Unatin 7-Up Co., Inc. v. Solomon, 39 A.2d 835 (Pa. 
1944) (impossible to value access to sugar or machinery for the 
manufacture of soft drinks during wartime quota system). 
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       and liquor dispensing establishment at a definite 
       location, and the possession of the premises on which 
       the same is located. There are no other premises nor is 
       there any other restaurant which is exactly like the one 
       involved here, and it would, for all practical purpose, 
       be impossible for . . . [appellee] to prove what money he 
       would lose if . . . [appellant] were permitted to breach 
       this contract . . . . 
 
Id. at 361-62 (ellipses and bracketed terms in original). 
 
In Easton Theaters, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Land and 
Mortgage Co., Inc., 401 A.2d 1333 (Pa. Super. 1979), a 
lessee sought specific performance of a landlord's 
agreement to build a movie theater for it on property 
adjacent to the landlord's shopping center. The Superior 
Court found that future profits would be impossible to 
calculate accurately and that the landlord had not shown 
that similar substitute properties were available to the 
lessee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's 
order of specific performance. The Supreme Court appears 
to have approved the reasoning of Easton Theaters in Petry 
v. Tanglwood Lakes, Inc., 522 A.2d 1053 (Pa. 1986). In 
Petry, the court affirmed the denial of a plaintiff's claim for 
specific performance of a developer's contractual promise to 
build a lake adjacent to plaintiff's property.10 Finding that 
"damages here can be readily computed or ascertained," 
522 A.2d at 1056, the court noted that: 
 
       This case is not similar to Goldman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 
       61, 247 A.2d 455 (1968), where a theater operator was 
       permitted to sue a landowner and builder for specific 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. It did so because, inter alia, the local condominium association had 
entered into a settlement with the developer requiring him to develop a 
recreational area on the site of the unbuilt lake. Thus, "[s]pecific 
enforcement of the covenant or building contract here at issue impinges 
on the rights and interests of other lot owners . . . . it is difficult to 
see 
how a purchaser in a condominium, or in a common development such 
as this, can reasonably argue that he or she purchased relying on, or is 
entitled to insist on, the absolute right to enforce specifically all 
executory agreements and promises originally made pertaining to the 
development, regardless of the wishes and rights of a majority of the 
other owners." 522 A.2d at 1057. 
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       performance of a contract for the erection and 
       operation of a theater. In that sort of case, involving 
       what essentially amounts to a joint business venture, 
       future business profits are of necessity speculative and 
       difficult to determine. 
 
In a footnote, the court acknowledged that its lost profits 
 
       point is not discussed directly in Goldman, but see 
       Easton Theaters, Inc., v. Wells Fargo Land and 
       Mortgage Co., Inc., 235 Pa. Superior Ct. 334, 401 A.2d 
       1333 (1979), where a lessee sought to compel a 
       landlord, by specific performance, to build a theater on 
       its (the landlord's) shopping center property. Superior 
       Court thought that the agreement was specifically 
       enforceable, not only because future profits would be 
       impossible to calculate accurately, but also because 
       the landlord had not shown that other similar 
       properties would be available to the lessee as a 
       substitute. 
 
Id. at 1056 n.7.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In our court, the most analogous Pennsylvania case arose in a 
setting that was the obverse of the case at bar, in the sense that the 
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief was the prospective seller who sought 
to 
compel specific performance of an agreement to purchase plaintiff's 
business that the buyer had declined to consummate. The District Court 
had found that the buyer's principal purpose in acquiring the company 
was to obtain certain of the trucking company's regulated transportation 
rights. Determining that " `an award of damages would be inappropriate 
because it would be very difficult to determine the value' " of the 
regulated transportation rights, this court upheld the District Court's 
grant of specific performance. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. 
Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing district court slip 
opinion at 43). Cf. Girard Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 524 
F. Supp. 884, 895, 896 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 
1982) (unpublished) (ordering specific performance of agreement in 
which insurance companies were to pay Girard in exchange for turning 
over security interests in boxcars on ground that measuring damages 
would be impossible because "[a]ny calculation of damages would require 
a complex inquiry into an assessment of the depreciated value of the 
boxcars, the changes in market price, the individual conditions of the 
boxcars, the adjustments for costs and expenses incurred during the 
management of the boxcars, as well as an accounting for the gross and 
net earnings of each boxcar."). 
 




We turn now to a review of cases from other jurisdictions. 
In C&S/Sovran Corp. v. First Fed. Savings Bank of 
Brunswick, 463 S.E.2d 892 (Ga. 1995), First Federal and 
C&S/Sovran -- banks whose shares were publicly traded -- 
had executed an agreement by which First Federal would 
be merged into C&S/Sovran in exchange for shares of 
C&S/Sovran stock. Three days before the deadline for 
consummation of the merger, First Federal filed suit in 
state court seeking specific performance and damages for 
breach of contract. Following trial, a jury found that 
C&S/Sovran had breached the merger agreement. 
C&S/Sovran moved for post-trial summary judgment on 
First Federal's specific performance claim, but the court 
denied the motion and "ordered C&S/Sovran to prepare 
and file all applications with Federal and State regulatory 
authorities necessary to accomplish the merger," as well as 
to take other steps necessary to consummate the merger. 
Id. at 894. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the order 
of specific performance. 
 
C&S/Sovran is the only opinion cited by counsel, or 
found by this court, which has addressed the applicability 
of the general rules of specific performance to a dispute 
arising out of the alleged breach of a merger agreement 
between two publicly traded companies. A number of other 
opinions, however, have considered grants of specific 
performance in cases falling within the broader category of 
broken agreements for the acquisition of an existing 
business or the development of a business opportunity. The 
First Circuit, applying Maine law, has upheld a grant of 
specific performance in the context of a buyer's claim 
arising from a breached contract for the sale of a minor 
league baseball franchise. Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. 
Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1987). 
Speaking through Judge Bownes, the First Circuit noted 
that every court inside or outside of Maine to have 
addressed the issue of a breach of contract to sell a 
franchise had concluded that specific performance was an 
appropriate remedy. Id. at 223. Finding that a baseball 
franchise was a unique business, id. at 224, and that 
measuring lost profits would be difficult, id. at 225, the 
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court reversed the district court and remanded the case for 
the entry of a decree of specific performance ordering the 
sale, id. at 228. See also Wooster Republican Printing Co. v. 
Channel 17, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 601, 621 (W.D. Mo. 1981) 
(applying Missouri law and ordering specific performance of 
breached contract to sell television station from one closely 
held corporation to another after finding that television 
station was "unique").12 
 
The Seventh Circuit read Illinois law in like fashion in 
Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 
984 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1993). Considering an appeal from 
a district court order that a seller convey all of the shares 
in a wholly-owned subsidiary to a buyer that had 
contracted for them, the court noted that "a contract for the 
sale of corporate stock not publicly traded can be 
specifically enforced on the ground that valuation is 
imprecise without an active market for the stock. 
Furthermore, specific performance is also appropriate for 
breach of a contract to sell a business because a business 
is a unique asset." Id. at 227.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The court found the television station unique on the basis of expert 
testimony at trial, which established that the station "presents an 
unusual potential for future growth in a stable and growing market. 
Because of its potential for expansion with proper management and 
infusion of capital, its relative position in the local and national 
markets, 
its network affiliation, its licensing and frequency, and its physical 
assets, among other things, Channel Seventeen is unique." Wooster 
Republican Printing Co., 533 F.Supp. at 621. See also Peabody Holding 
Co., Inc. v. Costain Group PLC, 813 F. Supp. 1402, 1421 (E.D. Mo. 1993) 
(granting injunction to block sale of business to third party that would 
have breached contract to sell business to plaintiff because: (1) 
agreement "expressly acknowledged `irreparable damage' to Peabody in 
the event of breach" (2) Costain's "coal businesses are unique, including 
the management contracts and equity interests in existing and potential 
mining properties" (3) breach of contract to sell business does 
irreparable harm to frustrated buyer by virtue of "loss of the opportunity 
to own or control that business."). 
 
13. The court turned from its general statement that "a business is a 
unique asset" to a description of the ways in which the subsidiary was 
unique: the plaintiff's "founder . . . is in the business of purchasing 
companies in order to `turn them around.' He purchased Medcom even 
though it had been losing money for several years. In purchasing 
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The Delaware Court of Chancery has engaged in a similar 
analysis. In True North Comm., Inc. v. Publicis, S.A., 711 
A.2d 34, 44-45 (Del. Ch. 1997), aff'd, 705 A.2d 244 (Del. 
1997), the court considered a controversy arising out of a 
soured joint venture agreement. Seeking to disentangle 
themselves, the two corporations that had entered into the 
joint venture agreement signed a subsequent agreement 
requiring each to assist its former partner in qualifying for 
pooling of interests accounting treatment in the event that 
the other sought to merge with a third party. When True 
North attempted to acquire a third party and to do so via 
pooling of interests, Publicis failed to provide the promised 
support. In concluding that specific performance was 
appropriate, the court noted that the dissolution agreement 
stipulated that injunctive relief would be available in the 
case of a breach. "Even without the contract language 
conceding the irreparable nature of the injury," the court 
continued, "it is nevertheless clear that True North will 
suffer irreparable harm if Publicis is not enjoined" because 
"Publicis' opposition efforts threaten to destroy the [third 
party] merger, which is a unique acquisition opportunity for 
True North." Id. at 44-45.14  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
businesses, Manley looked for the right `building blocks.' Without all the 
blocks, it is conceivable that the chances of a successful `turnaround' 
might be lowered. [The subsidiary] could well be one of those building 
blocks necessary to turn Medcom around." Medcom Holding Co, 984 F.2d 
at 227 (deposition citations omitted). 
 
14. The court did not explain why it deemed the enterprise True North 
was to acquire to be "a unique acquisition opportunity," but it did 
characterize that enterprise as "an international communications 
company with advertising and public relations agencies . . . around the 
world." Id. at 37. 
 
Courts have found specific performance appropriate where a buyer has 
been frustrated in attempting to exercise a contractual right to purchase 
or maintain a controlling (or even significant but non-controlling) 
interest 
in an enterprise. See Baggett v. Cyclopss Med. Sys., Inc., 935 P.2d 1265, 
1271 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997) 
(plaintiffs "view the shares as a means of control or influence over [the 
business], and not merely as instruments of financial investment"); King 
v. Stevenson, 445 F.2d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 1971) (affirming specific 
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These cases could be interpreted as imposing upon a 
plaintiff (the would-be acquirer) the burden of showing with 
some particularity that the business to be acquired is either 
inherently unique or offers a unique opportunity to the 
buyer. However, the cases go into little detail chronicling 
the attributes of uniqueness. Moreover, no case that has 
come to our attention has found a business either not 
unique or not offering a unique opportunity to the buyer. 
This militates against treating the plaintiff 's burden as an 
onerous one. We turn now to the question whether, in the 




We think it clear that the agreed-upon Allegheny-DQE 
merger constitutes a unique, non-replicable business 
opportunity for Allegheny. The Joint Proxy Statementfiled 
with the SEC and mailed to both corporations' shareholders 
describes several respects in which the integration of DQE 
and Allegheny could be expected to produce particular 
benefits: the contiguity of Allegheny's and DQE's service 
territories; DQE's particular expertise -- "better than its 
peer companies" -- in "developing unregulated businesses"; 
the complementarity of Allegheny's "winter-peaking, low- 
cost, efficient operations, and suburban and rural customer 
base" with DQE's "summer-peaking operations and urban 
customer base"; the "strategic fit" of DQE's "regulated and 
unregulated energy products and services" and Allegheny's 
"core businesses"; "the combined company's ability to take 
advantage of future strategic opportunities and to reduce 
its exposure to changes in economic conditions in any 
segment of its business"; and the expectation that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
performance of stock option agreement permitting majority shareholder 
to purchase shares from minority shareholder because "this block of 
stock was sufficiently important to [plaintiff] as president and 
developer" 
of company). Cf. Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 
1176, 1197 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (specific performance inappropriate where 
decree would not be sufficiently "definite and workable" despite general 
state rule that "[s]pecific performance is an ordinary remedy for breach 
of contract to convey corporate shares where the shares may constitute 
a controlling interest in a unique corporation"). 
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"combined company [would] . . . have the critical mass 
necessary to compete in a deregulated utility environment." 
In the measured prose of the Joint Proxy Statement, "the 
synergies estimated by the managements of [Allegheny] and 
DQE appear to be achievable." DQE has not undertaken to 
identify any available merger partner, other than itself, 
whose acquisition by Allegheny would yield even one, let 
alone all, of these very considerable business opportunities. 
Accordingly, if DQE has breached the merger agreement, 
Allegheny is entitled to specific performance. 
 
C. The Relationship Between Specific Perform ance and 
Irreparable Harm 
 
We now turn to a consideration of the harm that could 
befall Allegheny if a preliminary injunction were denied and 
DQE were to take any action destroying the possibility that 
the accounting aspects of the merger could be achieved 
pursuant to pooling of interests accounting. If the loss of 
pooling accounting were to block the ultimate 
consummation of the merger, Allegheny would suffer 
irreparable harm from the loss of the opportunity to control 
DQE. As the specific performance inquiry has shown, that 
loss could not be adequately recompensed through 
monetary damages. 
 
If the merger is consummated despite the loss of pooling 
of interests accounting, Allegheny would suffer irreparable 
harm because DQE -- by then a part of Allegheny-- would 
no longer be able to recompense Allegheny for the difference 
between the value of the merger under pooling of interests 
accounting and the value of the merger under purchase 
accounting. DQE contends that the loss of pooling of 
interests accounting treatment would not be irreparable 
because the District Court could recompense Allegheny for 
any economic losses it suffered from loss of pooling of 
interests accounting treatment by adjusting the merger 
exchange ratio to give Allegheny's shareholders a greater 
share of ownership of the combined company. Because the 
loss of pooling of interests accounting treatment triggers 
losses that are themselves economic in nature and 
susceptible to financial valuation, DQE argues, DQE 
shareholders could fully recompense Allegheny for DQE's 
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breach by giving Allegheny a greater share of the combined 
company, thus vitiating the irreparable nature of the harm. 
However, Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law does 
not permit changes in the consideration for a merger, once 
shareholder approval has been given, without a new 
shareholder vote. 15 P.S.A. S 1922 (b) states in relevant 
part that: 
 
       A plan of merger or consolidation may contain a 
       provision that the boards of directors of the constituent 
       corporations may amend the plan at any time prior to 
       its effective date, except that an amendment made 
       subsequent to the adoption of the plan by the 
       shareholders of any constituent corporation shall not 
       change: (1) The amount or kind of shares, obligations, 
       cash, property or rights to be received in exchange for 
       or on conversion of all or any of the shares of the 
       constituent corporation. 
 
Section 1922(b) constitutes one of the "rules of decision" 
guiding this court sitting in diversity. 28 U.S.C. S 1652. Erie 
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 
D. DQE's Arguments Against Irreparable Harm 
Under These Facts 
 
DQE offers several reasons why its alleged breach should 
not give rise to Allegheny's requested specific performance 
or, if specific performance is appropriate, why the District 
Court was nevertheless correct in determining that 
Allegheny would not suffer irreparable harm if the 
preliminary injunction is denied. DQE's principal 
arguments are as follows: 
 
(i) DQE argues that "injunctive relief . . . has only been 
granted in a corporate merger case where either (1) the 
contract contains an express provision reciting that 
damages would not be an adequate remedy for a breach 
and permitting the parties to seek injunctive relief and 
specific performance, or (2) the `target' company is non- 
public or closely-held thereby rendering it difficult to 
value." Def. Br. at 17-18 (emphasis in original). However, 
DQE cites no case holding -- or even stating in dictum -- 
that specific performance is not available unless the merger 
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contains an express provision permitting the parties to seek 
specific performance or the target is "non-public or closely- 
held." DQE's assertion that no such case has granted 
specific performance is thus no more than an assertion that 
no such case has yet arisen. It may be sufficient, for the 
purposes of the irreparable harm inquiry, that there is a 
contractual provision permitting specific performance15 or 
that a target is "non-public or closely-held," but the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never held either to be a 
necessary predicate to irreparable harm. We see no ground 
for supposing that the Commonwealth's highest court 
would craft such a rigid rule. 
 
(ii) DQE points to Section 8.5(b) of the merger 
agreement, which provides Allegheny with a merger 
termination fee not to exceed $50 million in the event that 
DQE terminates the contract in order to accept a better 
offer. See A43-44. DQE notes that "this provision is 
admittedly not triggered by a breach or other termination," 
but argues that the provision "reflects Allegheny's 
agreement and understanding that any `injury' stemming 
from its loss of the opportunity to merge with DQE may 
adequately be compensated through the payment of 
money." Def. Br. at 24. Pennsylvania law forecloses the 
argument that this provision of its own force precludes 
specific performance. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has stated, the presence of a liquidated damages provision 
in a contract "will not restrict the remedy thereto [i.e., to 
liquidated damages] or bar specific performance unless the 
language of the part of the agreement in question, or of the 
entire agreement . . . shows a contrary intent." Roth v. 
Hartl, 75 A.2d 583, 586 (Pa. 1950).16  Section 8.5(b) speaks 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Cf. True North Comm., Inc., v. Publicis, S.A., 711 A.2d 34, 44-45 
(Del. 
Ch.), aff'd, 705 A.2d 244 (Del. 1997) ("Even without the contract 
language conceding irreparable injury . . . it is nonetheless clear that 
True North will suffer irreparable harm if Publicis is not enjoined from 
pursuing its activities in opposition to the merger."). 
 
16. Peabody Holding Co., Inc. v. Costain Group P.L.C., 813 F. Supp. 1402, 
1421 (E.D. Mo. 1993) is also instructive: 
 
       Defendants argue, however, that the $5 million liquidated damages 
       provision . . . provides a reasonable estimate of the damages 
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only to the termination fee payable upon the unsolicited 
receipt of a superior merger offer. See A43. It states that "In 
the event that this Agreement is terminated (x ) by the 
Company pursuant to Section 8.3(a) (or 6.2), or (y) by 
Parent pursuant to Section 8.4(b)(i) or (iii), or (z) by the 
Company or Parent pursuant to Section 8.2(d), then the 
Company" shall pay a termination fee not to exceed $50 
million. A43. Section 8.3(a) states that "This Agreement 
may be terminated and the Merger may be abandoned at 
any time prior to the Effective Time, whether before or after 
the approval by stockholders of the Company . . . by action 
of the board of directors of the Company: (a) subject to and 
in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.2;" A42. 
Section 6.2 concerns acquisition proposals by third parties. 
A32-33. Likewise, Section 8.4(b)(i) states that "This 
Agreement may be terminated and the Merger may be 
abandoned at any time prior to the Effective Time, before or 
after the approval by stockholders of Parent . . . by action 
of the board of directors of Parent: (a) subject to and in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 6.2 . . . ." A43. 
We do not read Section 8.5(b) -- which governs the fee 
payable upon a termination of the merger agreement 
arising from an unsolicited receipt of a superior merger 
offer -- to evince an intent to bar specific performance for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Peabody would suffer. The Court disagrees with defendants. It is 
       clear, plainly on the face of S4.1(d) of the [stock purchase 
       agreement], that the liquidated damages provision applies only to 
       situations where no sale is consummated between Peabody and 
       Costain based solely upon the existence of an unsolicited proposal 
       which is superior to Peabody's. In such a circumstance, Peabody 
       has protected itself in case it cannot meet the superior offer. 
This 
       does not mean, however, that the provision states an adequate 
       remedy for circumstances where there is no unsolicited bid superior 
       to Peabody's and Costain has breached the [stock purchase 
       agreement]. Peabody needs no monetary protection in such a 
       circumstance because Costain has no right to terminate the 
       contract in pursuit of the better unsolicited offer. Thus, it is 
the 
       opinion of this Court that Peabody will suffer irreparable harm . . 
. . 
 
The court therefore granted specific performance. Id. at 1422-23. 
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breaches of the merger agreement unrelated to an 
unsolicited receipt of a superior merger offer. 17 
 
(iii) DQE argues that the benefits of this merger can be 
valued. It points out that the parties have already jointly 
valued one of the more important merger benefits-- the 
"synergies" that would arise from the merger: the Joint 
Proxy Statement filed with the SEC and mailed to both 
corporations' shareholders stated that the companies"have 
jointly studied the estimated synergies arising out of a 
combination of their companies. The companies estimated 
that the Merger could result in savings of approximately $1 
billion over the 10-year period from 1998 to 2008, taking 
into account the costs estimated to be necessary to achieve 
such synergies." A83. Moreover, DQE contends that the 
other benefits of the merger identified by Allegheny "are not 
elusive metaphysical concepts, but rather standard 
business phenomena that have long been quantified and 
valued by economists, investment bankers and other 
experts in commercial cases such as this." Def. Br. at 26. 
But DQE has not attempted to value the other (i.e., non- 
synergy) strategic benefits outlined in the Joint Proxy 
Statement. See A83. DQE's failure even to attempt a 
valuation of those other strategic benefits is telling.18 
 
(iv) DQE claims that Allegheny can bid on DQE's 
generating assets (which, according to DQE, are soon to 
appear on the block), and thus achieve one of the stated 
goals of the merger, "increas[ing] its generating capacity by 
almost one-third . . . ensuring that Allegheny will have the 
critical mass to compete in the generation market against 
its larger regional competitors." Pl. Br. at 12 (cited in Def. 
Br. at 28-29). Moreover, DQE argues, Allegheny can solicit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Nor is DQE aided by its recital of statements from Allegheny officials 
attesting to the financial harm that the failure of the merger would cause 
Allegheny. See, e.g., Def. Br. at 25-26. That Allegheny's officers once 
thought that they would pursue damages for breach simply does not 
speak to the issue of whether a fact-finder could calculate those 
damages with any accuracy. 
 
18. Indeed, even the synergies valuation in the proxy statement hedges: 
the companies "estimated that the Merger could result in savings of 
. . . ." A83 (emphasis added). 
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DQE's customers under Pennsylvania's newly deregulated 
energy market. But "critical mass" is only one of several 
merger benefits identified by the parties, and the statutory 
right to attempt to serve customers is not the equivalent of 
having a preexisting business relationship with them. 
 
(v) DQE argues that Allegheny could merge with other 
utility companies. It offers no suggestions as to which other 
companies are "exactly like the one involved here," 
Szpakowski, 49 A.2d at 362, i.e., which other companies 
would demonstrably provide Allegheny with the benefits 





For the reasons set forth above, we hold that Allegheny 
would be at serious risk of irreparable harm if preliminary 
injunctive relief were withheld. We will, therefore, vacate 
the judgment denying the preliminary injunction and 
remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the 
District Court should reassess -- in light of this opinion -- 
the three remaining factors in the four-factor determination 
of whether a preliminary injunction should issue.19 
 
We do not read the District Court as having conclusively 
decided whether Allegheny has a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits. We appreciate that the District 
Court characterized "Allegheny's submissions on this issue 
[as] persuasive," Memorandum Order at 3, but do not 
understand this characterization as intended to be fully 
dispositive of that complex question. Accordingly, we think 
the District Court should again assess the question of 
Allegheny's likelihood of success on the merits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The district court heard oral argument and considered the parties' 
submissions and supporting expert witness affidavits. With the 
advantage of hindsight, we note that an evidentiary hearing in which the 
parties' experts were subject to cross-examination from opposing counsel 
might have benefitted the district court. Particularly where opposing 
affidavits duel for the key to a dispositive issue, affidavits often prove 
a 
poor substitute for live testimony. 
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Likewise, the District Court should undertake to 
determine whether "whether granting preliminary relief will 
result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party" than 
the irreparable harm that denying preliminary relief would 
cause to the moving party. American Civil Liberties Union of 
New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 
F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). The question 
to be addressed is not whether DQE "would suffer some 
harm," Memorandum Order at 4, or whether "there is a 
possibility of harm," id. at 5, but which of two potential 
harms -- Allegheny's or DQE's -- is greater. 
 
Finally, the District Court should reconsider whether its 
reasons for finding that the public interest "weighs 
substantially against the granting of injunctive relief," are 
supported in our case law. In so doing, the District Court 
should determine whether its belief that the injunction 
would require "the court to become involved in the business 
affairs" of the parties presents a recognized rationale for a 
finding that a preliminary injunction would be against the 
public interest. In reassessing its belief that the injunction 
"could have an adverse effect through unintended collision 
with regulatory agencies and their statutory mandates" and 
thus run counter to the public interest, the District Court 
should bear in mind that three state regulatory agencies 
and two federal regulatory agencies have approved the 
merger, each finding that it is in the public interest; no 
state or federal agency has determined that the merger is 
not in the public interest. Cf. Schulz v. United States Boxing 
Ass'n, 105 F.3d 127, 134 (3d Cir. 1997) ("In determining [a 
state's] public policy, we turn to the enactments of the state 
legislature as an authoritative source."). 
 
Combining its reanalysis of these three factors with this 
opinion's holding on the fourth, the District Court should 
endeavor to "balance[ ] these four . . . factors to determine 
if an injunction should issue." American Civil Liberties 
Union of New Jersey, 84 F.3d at 1477 n.2. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court denying a 
preliminary injunction is vacated and the case remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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